12020-05-16T00:34:08  *** mol has quit IRC
 22020-05-16T01:04:25  *** jonatack has quit IRC
 32020-05-16T01:06:05  *** jonatack has joined ##taproot-bip-review
 42020-05-16T02:16:42  *** belcher has quit IRC
 52020-05-16T02:41:05  *** mol has joined ##taproot-bip-review
 62020-05-16T03:59:03  *** mol has quit IRC
 72020-05-16T04:02:53  *** mol has joined ##taproot-bip-review
 82020-05-16T08:13:59  *** Jackielove4u has joined ##taproot-bip-review
 92020-05-16T09:30:26  *** jonatack has quit IRC
102020-05-16T09:31:41  *** jonatack has joined ##taproot-bip-review
112020-05-16T09:56:52  *** belcher has joined ##taproot-bip-review
122020-05-16T11:19:01  *** mol_ has joined ##taproot-bip-review
132020-05-16T11:22:20  *** mol has quit IRC
142020-05-16T12:42:23  <harding> Posting here in case it helps anyone avoid spending a couple hours going down a mental blind alley.  aj wrote about how committing to Coin.nHeight would be an anti-feature in https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2020-May/017813.html
152020-05-16T12:42:23  <harding> I had what I thought was a clever idea of only making such a commitment if that input's nSequence used a BIP68-restricted value, i.e. the UTXO couldn't be spent in the same block as its parent anyway.
162020-05-16T12:42:23  <harding> That works great if you're signing after the parent is confirmed, but it wasn't until I'd spent a bunch of time describing the benefits of this idea for anti fee sniping that I realized it doesn't work for presigned transactions, e.g. in contract protocols like LN or in the recent vault proposals.  Anyway, lesson learned: listen to aj when he says something isn't worth adding.  :-)
172020-05-16T12:44:53  <harding> presigned transactions [that use BIP68]*
182020-05-16T13:02:54  *** jonatack has quit IRC
192020-05-16T13:05:12  *** jonatack has joined ##taproot-bip-review
202020-05-16T13:07:09  *** mol_ has quit IRC
212020-05-16T13:33:27  *** mol has joined ##taproot-bip-review
222020-05-16T13:41:35  *** mol_ has joined ##taproot-bip-review
232020-05-16T13:41:49  *** mol has quit IRC
242020-05-16T13:44:47  *** molz_ has joined ##taproot-bip-review
252020-05-16T13:47:24  *** mol_ has quit IRC
262020-05-16T14:26:54  *** molz_ has quit IRC
272020-05-16T15:00:49  *** mol has joined ##taproot-bip-review
282020-05-16T16:11:20  *** luke-jr has quit IRC
292020-05-16T16:12:04  *** luke-jr has joined ##taproot-bip-review
302020-05-16T16:16:40  <ghost43> harding: also, a reorg of the parent tx could invalidate the child tx :/
312020-05-16T16:20:22  <harding> ghost43: right, that I at least did think about and my aborted email noted that required careful consideration especially in the context of contract protocols (it was actually that thought that lead me to it breaking presigned BIP68-using txes).  However, that it's that exact disadvantage which also provided its advantage for anti fee sniping.  Unlike existing anti fee sniping where a dishonest miner can still get the
322020-05-16T16:20:22  <harding> transaction fee (they just can't bury high-fee transactions as far back as they'd like), anti fee sniping based on a commitment to the header hash of the block including the UTXO would invalidate the child tx and completely deny the dishonest mine any revenue from it.
332020-05-16T16:27:54  <harding> ghost43: here's what I had written by the point I realized the flaw, in case it's useful or you just want to see how foolish I am  :-)  https://gist.github.com/harding/e1316f2e012a354decef939ca6cd82cc
342020-05-16T18:34:15  *** lukedashjr has joined ##taproot-bip-review
352020-05-16T18:36:55  *** luke-jr has quit IRC
362020-05-16T18:39:39  *** lukedashjr is now known as luke-jr
372020-05-16T22:12:02  *** luke-jr has quit IRC
382020-05-16T22:20:28  *** luke-jr has joined ##taproot-bip-review
392020-05-16T23:48:31  *** mol_ has joined ##taproot-bip-review
402020-05-16T23:51:09  *** mol has quit IRC
412020-05-16T23:57:12  *** mol_ has quit IRC